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XOCHITL TORRES SMALL*

Water Use and Recycling in Hydraulic
Fracturing: Creating a Regulatory
Pilot for Smarter Water Use
in the West
ABSTRACT
Hydraulic fracturing faces significant criticism for its water use but
that attention is relatively undeserved when compared with the far
greater consumption of other sectors. Even so, such criticism, combined with heightened water scarcity, ongoing industry action to reuse produced water, and environmental concerns regarding
produced water disposal, creates an opportunity to pilot a regulatory
system that incentivizes water conservation. The regulatory system
should address a broad range of stakeholder concerns by incentivizing continuous technology development, establishing rules that are
predictable and easy to enforce, and increasing water recycling in
water scarce regions. This article considers multiple regulatory tools
to create such a program and presents a proposal that leverages the
relative strengths of these tools.

I. INTRODUCTION
Hydraulic fracturing1 uses a lot of water, but the practice uses far
less water than other sectors. From 2011 to 2013, hydraulic fracturing
operations used approximately 97 billion gallons of water,2 but this
water amounts to less than one percent of water used in every state
where it is practiced.3 In Texas, which used half of all water used for
hydraulic fracturing in the United States in 2012,4 oil and gas water use is
* Xochitl Torres Small is a current student at the University of New Mexico School of
Law. She thanks her husband, Nathan, for his tireless support, Professor Alex Ritchie for
his big ideas and close editing, and the Natural Resources Journal for their careful
revisions.
1. Hydraulic fracturing is also referred to as “fracing” and “fracking.” The term
“fracking” seems to have developed as the more common term, but both options retain
political connotations. See Alex Ritchie, On Local Fracking Bans: Policy and Preemption in New
Mexico, 55 NAT. RESOURCES J. 255, 262 n.41 (2014). In this article, I will use “hydraulic fracturing” because it describes the prominent role of water in the process.
2. MONIKA FREYMAN, CERES, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING & WATER STRESS: WATER DEMAND BY THE NUMBERS 5 (2014), available at http://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/hydraulic-fracturing-water-stress-water-demand-by-the-numbers.
3. Thomas W. Merrill & David M. Schizer, The Shale Oil and Gas Revolution, Hydraulic
Fracturing, and Water Contamination: A Regulatory Strategy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 145, 177 (2013).
4. FREYMAN, supra note 2, at 49.
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minimal compared to irrigation (56 percent) and municipal use (26 percent).5 In terms of proportional water use, hydraulic fracturing is not
causing the water scarcity increasingly experienced in the West.
Even so, hydraulic fracturing exacerbates water scarcity. Since
2011, almost half of all hydraulically fractured wells were in regions with
high or extremely high water stress.6 In 2011, over half of all hydraulically fractured wells were operating in drought-stricken regions.7 A hydraulically fractured well uses up to four million gallons of water,8 and
most of the water permanently leaves the water cycle after its first use.9
In water scarce regions, the dramatic increase in water consumption
from hydraulic fracturing creates a zero sum game where each new use
raises the price of water.10 Those higher prices impact other users, especially farmers.11 Oil and gas is not the thirstiest industry by far, but its
rapid increase in consumption is a new use in water scarce regions and
that increase draws attention and heated debate.12
The debate involving hydraulic fracturing in general, and its
water use specifically, could also present an opportunity for water conservation. Hydraulic fracturing does not enjoy unwavering popularity
due to continuing concerns about the impact hydraulic fracturing may
have on water quality,13 earthquakes,14 surface owner uses,15 and de5. Jean-Philippe Nicot & Bridget R. Scanlon, Water Use for Shale-Gas Production in
Texas, U.S., 46 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 3580, 3584 (2012).
6. FREYMAN, supra note 2, at 6.
7. Id.
8. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, STUDY OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES: PROGRESS REPORT 80 (2012), available at http://
www.epa.gov/hfstudy/pdfs/hf-report20121214.pdf.
9. See JOEL R. BURCAT & ANDREW T. BOCKIS, SHALE DRILLING AND HYDRAULIC FRACTURING: AN INTRODUCTION TO STATE AND FEDERAL REGULATORY ISSUES 3 (2012) (stating that
wastewater from most shale plays is injected underground); FREYMAN, supra note 2, at 41.
10. See Garance Burke, Fracking Fuels Water Fights in Nation’s Dry Spots, DENVER POST
(June 16, 2013), http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_23472294/fracking-fuels-waterfights-nations-dry-spots (reporting that oil and gas companies have paid $1,200 to $2,900
an acre foot for water typically costing $100 an acre foot in Colorado).
11. See Jack Healy, For Farms in the West, Oil Wells are Thirsty Rivals, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
5, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/06/us/struggle-for-water-in-colorado-withrise-in-fracking.html?pagewanted=all (quoting a corn and alfalfa farmer as saying, “I don’t
think in reality that the farmer can compete with the oil and gas companies for that water.
Their return is a hell of a lot better than ours”). But see Burke, supra note 10 (quoting a
farmer who sold water to a hydraulic fracturing operator to make money when he had
insufficient water to plant that season).
12. See Burke, supra note 10 (quoting a Texas Groundwater Conservation District Manager) (“When you have a big problem like the drought and you add other smaller problems
to it like all the fracking, then it only makes things worse.”).
13. Congress directed the Environmental Protection Agency to study the potential impacts of hydraulic fracturing on drinking water, which should be available in 2014. See
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creased demand for renewable energy.16 As a new user, hydraulic fracturing garners attention for its water use, even though it uses far less
water than older, more accepted water uses, such as agriculture.17 At the
same time, oil and gas producers are already investing in technologies to
reduce freshwater consumption.18 Whereas governments often face political pushback to encourage water efficiency,19 a regulatory program that
decreases water consumption in hydraulic fracturing could both encourage existing industry efforts and receive support from those critical
of the practice.
A program to incentivize water recycling, could address another
challenge for the oil and gas industry: water contamination. Oil and gas
producers add chemicals to the water they use in hydraulic fracturing to
increase the fractures used for oil and gas production.20 Most of this
“flowback” water returns to the surface and brings with it more water
from deep underground.21 This “produced” water contains excessive
amounts of dissolved solids, including salts and naturally-occurring radioactive materials.22 Together, the injected flowback water and the produced water from deep underground create wastewater that can
contaminate limited freshwater supplies if not appropriately handled.23
Although industry disposes of this contaminated wastewater from hydraulic fracturing, current disposal methods create environmental risks.
EPA’s Study of Hydraulic Fracturing and Its Potential Impact on Drinking Water Resources, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/hfstudy (last visited Mar. 6, 2015).
14. Thomas E. Kurth, Michael J. Mazzone, Mary S. Mendoza & Christopher S. Kulander, American Law and Jurisprudence on Fracing, 58 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 4-1, 4-27
(2012).
15. Id. at 4-41 to 4-46.
16. Thomas W. Merrill, Four Questions About Fracking, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 971, 981
(2013).
17. In 2010, agriculture used over 78 percent of all water withdrawn in New Mexico.
JOHN W. LONGWORTH ET AL., NEW MEXICO STATE ENGINEER OFFICE, NEW MEXICO WATER USE
BY CATEGORIES 2010, at i (2013), available at http://www.ose.state.nm.us/Pub/TechnicalReports/TechReport%2054NM%20Water%20Use%20by%20Categories%20.pdf.
18. FREYMAN, supra note 2, at 12.
19. Kate Galbraith, Texas Farmers Battle Ogallala Pumping Limits, TEX. TRIB. (Mar. 18,
2012), https://www.texastribune.org/2012/03/18/texas-farmers-regulators-battle-overogallala/ (“Hardberger, of the Environmental Defense Fund, said that farmers could do
more to conserve. Farmers, meanwhile, say cities could do more. Lubbock, for example,
draws entirely from the Ogallala right now, and seeing swimming pools full when farmers
are facing restrictions ‘makes it hard to swallow,’ Fondren said.”).
20. See infra notes 35–40 and accompanying text.
21. MARCUS OLIVER GAY ET AL., WATER MANAGEMENT IN SHALE GAS PLAYS 4 (2012),
available at http://connect.ihs.com/StaticDocuments/LandingPage/WaterManagement
.pdf.
22. Id. at 5.
23. Merrill & Schizer, supra note 3, at 195–96.
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The most frequent environmental citations in New Mexico are for produced water spills.24 In Pennsylvania, industry disposes wastewater
from hydraulic fracturing into municipal wastewater treatment plants,
which has caused documented cases of ground water contamination.25
Generally, storage in pits can result in seepage, which could contaminate
groundwater.26 In addition to contamination, underground injection also
imposes risks of seismic activity.27 By injecting water deep underground,
states lose the ability to use it in the future.28 States, consequently, have
significant reasons to encourage industry to recycle its wastewater.
Western states could increase their total available water by helping develop technology to clean all wastewater from hydraulic fracturing. If produced water, which is new to the hydrologic cycle,29 could be
cleaned to a usable level, this previously untapped resource would increase the total water budget. New water could be available for other
uses. Western states, moreover, have vast untapped resources of aquifers
24. Hannah Wiseman, Fracturing Regulation Applied, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 361,
374 (2012). For additional information on produced water spills in New Mexico in 2014, see
New Mexico Toxic Release Tracker, CENTER FOR WESTERN PRIORITIES, http://westernpriorities
.org/new-mexico-toxic-release-tracker/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2015) (reporting the largest
produced water spill in New Mexico in 2014 at 3,050 barrels of contaminated water and
determining that the companies that spill the most often are BOPCO, COG Production,
COG Operating, and Yates Petroleum). The New Mexico Oil and Gas Conservation District
issues citations, but lacks authority to require fines. Mike Soraghan, In N.M., 3,600 Violations, 1 Court Case, 0 Fines, EnergyWire, Nov. 14, 2013, available at http://www.eenews.net/
stories/1059990413.
25. Sheila M. Olmstead et al., Shale Gas Development Impacts on Surface Water Quality in
Pennsylvania, 110 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. 4962, 4966 (2013), available at http://www.pnas
.org/content/110/13/4962.full.pdfťml (“In 2008, monitors detected record TDS levels
(mainly [chloride] and sulfates) in sections of the Monongahela River during low late summer-early fall flows, and 13 public drinking water system intakes in Pennsylvania and
West Virginia exceeded secondary maximum contaminant levels under the Safe Drinking
Water Act, persisting through December 2008 . . . .” “Results for [chloride] suggest that the
presence of shale gas wells upstream in a monitor’s watershed does not raise observed
concentrations but that the treatment and release of wastewater from shale gas wells by
permitted facilities upstream in a monitor’s watershed does.”); see generally Kimberly M.
Parker et al., Enhanced Formation of Disinfection Byproducts in Shale Gas Wastewater-Impacted
Drinking Water Supplies, 48 ENVIRON. SCI. TECHNOL. 11161–69 (2014).
26. Hannah Wiseman, Fracturing Regulation Applied, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 361,
384 (2012) (noting that New Mexico had more than 200 active cases of groundwater contamination from improper pit maintenance in 2008).
27. Merrill & Schizer, supra note 3, at 179 (“Seismic activity related to disposal of fracturing waste in injection wells has led to regulatory responses in Ohio and Arkansas.”).
28. Gay et al., supra note 21, at 6.
29. See Katie L. Benko & Jörg E. Drewes, Produced Water in the Western United States:
Geographical Distribution, Occurrence, and Composition, 25 ENVTL. ENGINEERING SCI. 239, 239
(2008) (“Coproduced water is defined as water that is extracted from subsurface geologic
formations containing oil and gas.”).
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with brackish water.30 Governments and industry continue to invest in
more efficient desalination technology to clean brackish water.31 Western
states stand to benefit from facilitating existing industry interest in
desalination technology development.
The oil and gas industry is not employing technology to recycle its
wastewater in the west because it currently does not make economic
sense. On average, producers spend about 10 percent of well costs on
water management needs.32 Industry investment in recycling technology
impacts on the ground practices only if producers can achieve a practical
rate of return.33 In many western shale plays, groundwater is particularly
salty and injection and other disposal methods are prevalent; consequently, producers do not voluntarily recycle on a large scale where it is
most needed—in the arid West.34 Additionally, technological develop-

30. Sanjeev Kalaswad, Brent Christian & Rima Petrossian, TEX. WATER BD., BRACKISH
GROUNDWATER IN TEXAS 1 (2004), available at http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/publications/
reports/numbered_reports/doc/r363/b2.pdf (“A 2003 study . . . suggests that there is approximately 2.7 billion acre-feet of brackish groundwater in the aquifers of [Texas].”). Both
produced water and brackish water contain high levels of salt; whereas produced water
can contain 800–300,000 milligrams per liter (mg/L) of total dissolved solids (“TDS”),
brackish water is defined as water that contains 1,000–10,000 mg/L. See Sheila M. Olmstead
et al., Shale Gas Development Impacts on Surface Water Quality in Pennsylvania, 110 Proc. Nat’l
Acad. Sci. 4962, 4963 (2013) (providing the TDS level for produced water); id. at 2 (providing the TDS level for brackish water); PA. STATE UNIV. COLL. OF AGRIC. SCI., SHAPING PROPOSED CHANGES TO PENNSYLVANIA’S TOTAL DISSOLVED SOLIDS STANDARD: A GUIDE TO THE
PROPOSAL AND THE COMMENTING PROCESS 3 (2010).
31. See generally SANDIA NAT’L LAB. & BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE NATIONAL DESALINATION AND WATER PURIFICATION TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP (2003),
available at http://www.sandia.gov/~pvbrady/DesalImplementRoadmap.pdf.
32. Gay et al., supra note 21, at 3.
33. See Matthew E. Mantell, Chesapeake Energy Corp., Produced Water Reuse and
Recycling Challenges and Opportunities Across Major Shale Plays, Presentation at Envtl.
Prot. Agency Hydraulic Fracturing Study Technical Workshop #4 Water Resources Management, 44 (Mar. 29–30, 2011), slides available at http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/
files/documents/09_Mantell_-_Reuse_508.pdf (“For example, in areas with extensive salt
water disposal well infrastructure like the Barnett Shale, salt water disposal wells are in
close proximity to operations, and are a low cost, low energy, safe, and effective alternative
to advanced reuse.”).
34. Jim Fuquay, Water Recycling is Big Business for Oil, Gas Support Firms, STAR TEL.
(Apr. 27, 2013), http://txwra.org/images/Water_Recycling_is_Big_Business
_FWST_042713.pdf (discussing how producers in the Barnett Shale initially had little incentive to recycle water, because they could “acquire plenty of water at relatively low prices,
and disposal wells provided a ready means of getting rid” of the water, and noting that
producers still only recycle about 5 percent of water used for hydraulic fracturing in the
Barnett Shale).
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ment requires a large upfront investment.35 Since industry has already
responded by recycling wastewater in regions where disposal options
are scarce,36 western states should create scarcity by capping freshwater
use to a percentage of their operations, limiting disposal options through
injection taxes, and mandating water use and recycling reporting. States
should also expand recycling in more challenging environments by investing in technology development opportunities for desalination.
This article urges states to adopt a regulatory program that best
incentivizes recycling of wastewater from hydraulic fracturing. Part II
describes relevant aspects of hydraulic fracturing. Part III discusses existing regulations relevant to recycling wastewater from hydraulic fracturing. Part IV provides an overview of opportunities and challenges for
developing a regulatory system to better incentivize recycling. Part V
analyzes commonly employed tools—liability, command and control,
marketable permits, and taxation—available for environmental regulations. Part VI then proposes a comprehensive regulatory program to incentivize recycling of wastewater from hydraulic fracturing. The
proposal leverages elements of existing regulatory tools to allow oil and
gas producers to recycle produced wastewater efficiently, encourage
continuous innovation, invest in basic research for new technologies, and
provide information for public assurance and state enforcement.
II. BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO HYDRAULIC FRACTURING
Although oil and gas producers have practiced aspects of horizontal hydraulic fracturing for decades, hydraulic fracturing recently exploded in commercial use.37 Since 1949, the oil industry has
commercially pressurized wells to cause small fractures in the geologic
formation to increase production.38 Although oil and gas producers
drilled the first horizontal well in 1929, producers were unable to commercialize the process until the early 1980s.39 In the 1940s, industry began to combine these practices with fluid additives to create more,
smaller fractures that successfully release oil and gas in shale forma35. David Wethe & Peter Ward, Fracking Bonanza Eludes Wastewater Recycling Investors,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-26/fracking-bonanza-eludes-wastewater-recycling-investors.html.
36. See infra notes 82–95 and accompanying text.
37. ZHONGMIN WANG & ALAN KRUPNICK, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, A RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW OF SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: WHAT LED TO THE BOOM? 1 (2013),
available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/documents/RFF-DP-13-12.pdf.
38. Hannah J. Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and Gas
Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 122 (2009).
39. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DRILLING SIDEWAYS — A REVIEW OF HORIZONTAL WELL
TECHNOLOGY AND ITS DOMESTIC APPLICATION 7 (1993).
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tions;40 however, researchers continue to refine these formulas.41 Between
2005 and 2010, a perfect storm, including high natural gas prices, government policies, and private entrepreneurship, culminated in technological
innovation that caused the shale gas boom.42 From January 2011 through
May 2013, approximately 39,294 wells were hydraulically fractured in
the United States.43
Wastewater from hydraulic fracturing includes two separate types
of water. To hydraulically fracture formations, oil and gas producers mix
water with sand and additives to create a solution that is approximately
99.5 percent water.44 The composition of the remaining ingredients varies
from operator to operator.45 Although the exact formulas are typically
confidential for proprietary reasons, formulas generally include ingredients such as salt, acid, distillates, ethylene glycol, isopropanol, sodium,
and potassium carbonate.46 During production, 20–80 percent of that
water returns to the surface as flowback water.47 Additionally, water
from deep underground accompanies the oil or gas that rises to the surface after fracturing.48 This “produced water” naturally contains trace
amounts of mercury, lead, arsenic, radioactive material such as radium,
thorium, uranium, gases, and organic material. The organic material in
the produced water includes volatile organic compounds.49 The produced water’s high concentration of salt, or total dissolved solids (TDS),
presents perhaps the most challenges for reuse. TDS in produced water
may range from 800 to 300,000 milligrams per liter (mg/L), exceeding
ocean water concentrations of 35,000 mg/L.50 Some of the greatest envi-

40. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EVALUATION OF IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF
DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE RESERVOIRS 4-1 ( 2004),
available at nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPURL.cgi?Dockey=P100A99N.TXT.
41. Id.
42. WANG & KRUPNICK, supra note 37, at 3–4.
43. FREYMAN, supra note 2, at 5.
44. Thomas E. Kurth et al., American Law and Jurisprudence on Fracing, 58 ROCKY MT.
MIN. L. INST. 4-1, at 7 (2012).
45. See id. (“[C]ontractors are protective of the exact recipe of their fracing fluids, considering the ingredients and the ratio with which the ingredients are mixed with the water
to make the fracing fluid to be trade secrets.”).
46. Id.
47. Gay et al., supra note 21, at 4.
48. Merrill & Schizer, supra note 3, at 185 (explaining that produced water is “water
that had accumulated naturally in the shale formation” that was pushed to the surface from
oil and gas operations).
49. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, STUDY OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES: PROGRESS REPORT 18 n.11 (2012), available at http://
www.epa.gov/hfstudy/pdfs/hf-report20121214.pdf.
50. PA. STATE UNIV. COLL. OF AGRIC. SCI., SHAPING PROPOSED CHANGES TO PENNSYLVANIA’S TOTAL DISSOLVED SOLIDS STANDARD: A GUIDE TO THE PROPOSAL AND THE COM-
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ronmental issues surrounding the dramatic increase in hydraulic fracturing relate to the acquisition of fresh water and disposal of flowback and
produced waters.
III. EXISTING REGULATIONS THAT MAY INCREASE
RECYCLING WASTEWATER FROM HYDRAULIC FRACTURING
Currently, governments have little regulation to incentivize recycling wastewater from hydraulic fracturing, and the most relevant regulations focus on removing regulatory barriers to recycling, monitoring
the quality of other means of disposal, and reporting the amount and use
of water. In 2013, Texas amended its rule to eliminate permit requirements for recycling water on-site and transferring water to another operator’s lease for recycling.51 Many other states, however, fail to even
address water recycling in their oil and gas regulations.52
Recent changes in New Mexico demonstrate potential opportunities to reduce regulation and encourage wastewater recycling. In 2013,
New Mexico published a notice clarifying that “[n]o [Oil Conservation
Division] permit or authorization is required for the re-use of produced
water. . . .”53 More recently, on March 31, 2015, the New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission promulgated a rule to encourage oil and gas producers to recycle wastewater by reducing wastewater storage
requirements in recycling facilities.54 The oil and gas industry was instrumental in drafting this rule.55 The Secretary of Energy and Minerals invited representatives from the industry to form a committee to provide
expertise on the technical requirements to facilitate recycling and retain

MENTING PROCESS 3 (2010), available at http://extension.psu.edu/water/conservation/
consumption-and-usage/TDS-highres-updateDec09.pdf/view; see also 40 C.F.R. § 144.3
(1983) (setting the federal standard for drinking water at 1,000 parts per million).
51. R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., PRESS RELEASE: RAILROAD COMMISSION TODAY ADOPTS NEW
RECYCLING RULES TO HELP ENHANCE WATER CONSERVATION BY OIL & GAS OPERATORS (Mar.
26, 2013), available at http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/pressreleases/2013/032613.php.
52. NATHAN RICHARDSON ET AL., RES. FOR THE FUTURE, THE STATE OF STATE SHALE GAS
REGULATION 52 (2013), available at http://www.rff.org/rff/documents/RFF-Rpt-StateofStateRegs_Report.pdf.
53. OIL CONSERVATION DIV., NO OCD PERMIT REQUIRED FOR RE-USE OF PRODUCED
WATER (Sept. 9 2013), available at http://www.emnrd.state.nm.us/OCD/documents/
Noticeproducedwaterre-use.pdf.
54. See N.M. CODE R. § 19.15.34.6 (LexisNexis 2015) (“OBEJCTIVE: To encourage the
recycling, reuse or disposition of produced water by use in a manner that will afford reasonable protection against contamination of fresh water and establish procedures by which
persons may transport and dispose of produced water, drilling fluids and other liquid oil
field waste.”); compare id. § 19.15.34.11 with id. §§ 19.15.17.11(F) and 19.17.11(G)(10).
55. Telephone Interview with William Carr, Senior Counsel, Concho Resources (Apr.
15, 2015).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMN\55-2\NMN205.txt

unknown

Seq: 9

18-JUN-15

11:25

Spring 2015WATER USE AND RECYCLING IN HYDRAULIC FRACTURING417

safe operations.56 The rule allows oil and gas producers to store produced water in lined, mesh enclosed pits as long as the pits follow certain specifications and the producers register these “recycling
containments” with the New Mexico Oil Conservation Division district
office.57 These recycling containments relax some requirements for other
wastewater pits in New Mexico58 in order to facilitate recycling.59 All recycling facilities, including containments, however, must report all water
received for recycling, account for fresh water used at the recycling facility, and report the total water volume eventually recycled.60 The facility
operator must also record sources and use of all recycled water.61 Although this rule is a significant step towards reducing regulation to facilitate wastewater recycling, it remains to be seen whether the
environmental protections will be strong enough62 and whether the reduced requirements will significantly increase recycling.63
Even where states do not regulate recycling, federal law mandates
that all states monitor disposal of wastewater from hydraulic fracturing

56. Id.; e-mail from William Carr, Senior Counsel, Concho Resources, to Xochitl Torres
Small, student, Univ. of N.M. Sch. of Law (Apr. 21, 2015, 17:01 MST) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Carr e-mail].
57. N.M. CODE R. §§ 19.15.34.9(B), 19.15.34.11, 19.15.34.12 (LexisNexis 2015).
58. Although section 19.15.34.11 establishes no volume limit for the construction or
design of recycling containments, sections 19.15.17.11(F) and 19.17.11(G)(10) restrict volume of temporary and permanent pits to 10 acre-feet.
59. Carr e-mail, supra note 56.
60. Id. § 19.15.34.9(E).
61. Id. § 19.15.34.9(F).
62. Id. § 19.15.34.11. This section establishes stringent siting requirements, which include a further setback requirement from a continuously flowing water source than pits
governed by section 19.15.17.10(A)(1)(B). In addition, section 19.15.34.13 provides significant operational requirements and section 19.15.34.21 provides the New Mexico Oil Conservation Division with enforcement powers to cease operations. However, enforcement
against the oil and gas industry is notoriously weak in New Mexico. See Mike Soraghan, In
N.M., 3,600 violations, 1 court case, 0 fines, ENERGYWIRE (Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.eenews
.net/stories/1059990413.
63. See New rule clears way for NM oil producers to reuse water, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Mar. 19,
2015), http://www.abqjournal.com/557662/biz/biz-most-recent/new-rule-clears-way-fornm-oil-producers-to-reuse-water.html. Even if the rule successfully increases wastewater
recycling on private and state lands, these provisions may not be acceptable on federal
lands. The Bureau of Land Management recently released a rule for Hydraulic Fracturing
on Federal and Indian Lands, which requires further setbacks from intermittent streams.
Compare § 19.15.34.11(A)(2) with Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 80 Fed.
Reg. 16128. 16220 (Mar. 26, 2015) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160). Although the federal
regulation allows for state variances, the rule specifically restricts pit containment, id., and
only allows variances where the operator will still “satisfy the objectives of the regulation,”
id. at 16221. Still, the Bureau of Land Management may allow pits for recycling as a part of
disposal pursuant to Onshore Order 7. See id. at 36162.
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to protect water resources from contamination via underground migration. The federal government requires states to regulate underground injection of wastewater from hydraulic fracturing pursuant to the Safe
Water Drinking Act, which includes the EPA regulated Underground Injection Control (“UIC”).64 For example, the New Mexico Oil Conservation
Division monitors the safety of underground injection wells.65 Operators
must submit monitoring reports to the state to prevent leakage and conduct Mechanical Integrity Tests prior to initial injection and every five
years thereafter.66 Finally, New Mexico uses the newly developed Risk
Based Data Management System, which was developed by the Ground
Water Protection Council to record and track relevant safety data in underground wells.67 At a minimum, states uphold a federal mandate to
monitor waste injected underground to prevent risks to drinking water.
Some states are starting to regulate underground wastewater injection wells beyond federally required permitting and monitoring. Colorado, for example, requires commercial injection well operators to
provide $50,000 for each facility.68 Ohio charges injectors five cents per
barrel for substances injected from within the regulatory district or an
adjoining district and twenty cents per barrel for injected fluid from elsewhere.69 Recently, two states and one city halted injection in specific areas due to seismic activity.70 States are slowly, but increasingly,
becoming more involved in regulating underground injection wells.
Although some states require general information reporting, few
states require oil and gas producers to report fresh water use. The recently promulgated New Mexico rule requires producers to report freshwater use in recycling operations, but it does not require reporting of
other freshwater use in hydraulic fracturing operations.71 Pennsylvania
requires extensive water use reporting, including the volume of water
used by each source, but Texas largely exempts the oil and gas industry
from any groundwater reporting requirements. Kentucky does not require reporting for ground or surface water.72 While it is cost effective to
64. The Safe Water Drinking Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300h (2006); 40 C.F.R. § 144.1 (1988).
65. See generally OIL CONSERVATION DIVISION, NEW MEXICO’S UNDERGROUND INJECTION
CONTROL (UIC) PROGRAM: CLASS II WELL FACTS (n.d.), available at http://www.emnrd.state
.nm.us/OCD/documents/UICINJECTIONWELLBROCHURE.pdf.
66. Id. at 5.
67. Id.
68. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:702 (LexisNexis 2008).
69. OHIO REV. CODE § 1509.22(B) (West 2010) (limiting total payment to $50,000 a year
per injection site).
70. RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 52, at 53 (citing restrictions in regions of Arkansas,
Ohio, and Ft. Worth, Texas).
71. See N.M. CODE R. § 19.15.34.9(E), (F) (LexisNexis 2015).
72. FREYMAN, supra note 2, at 34–35, 56.
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invest in recycling technology in certain regions, industry may not always have an incentive to report its percentage of freshwater use in
every region. Businesses have a disincentive to report their water use
when they are behind the technology curve or the businesses operate in
regions where recycling is especially challenging.73 Reporting is important, however, because it allows states to better track use, plan for disposal needs, and evaluate effectiveness of other measures.74
Although some states have regulations that allow and monitor recycling, existing measures are insufficient to encourage rapid large scale
recycling. The challenge is even greater in the arid West, where water is
scare but disposal by injection is relatively available.
IV. ENHANCING REGULATION TO RECYCLE MORE
WASTEWATER FROM HYDRAULIC FRACTURING
Governments may more easily regulate efforts to recycle wastewater from hydraulic fracturing compared to other activities, such as
curbing emissions or water pollution. Alternatives to recycling already
require permitting as mandated by the Safe Drinking Water Act and corresponding state legislation,75 permits for land application,76 and quality
requirements for disposal into public and private wastewater treatment
plants.77 A few states already carefully monitor water use.78 Moreover, it
is easier to measure a basic quantity of water disposed or recycled compared to quantifying pollution,79 discharge quality,80 or even monitoring
technology requirements.81 Consequently, any regulatory system should

73. See id., at 46 (“Investors similarly lament that they don’t have full information to
assess water risks.”).
74. Id. (“Many water managers readily concede they cannot assess the impacts of new
hydraulic fracturing water demands because the data is missing.”).
75. The Safe Water Drinking Act 42 U.S.C. § 300h (2006); 40 C.F.R. § 144.1 (1988).
76. RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 52, at 55 (Resources for the Future, June 2013) (“In
11 states, regulations explicitly allow wastewater to be used for “land treatments” such as
ice and dust control or road stabilization, though some of these states require advance
approval and/or apply restrictive conditions to the practice.”).
77. See 25 PA. CODE § 78.55 (2013); N.M. CODE R. § 19.15.34 (2008); 2 COLO. CODE REGS.
§ 404-1:907(c) (LexisNexis 2011).
78. 25 PA. CODE § 78.122(b)(6) (2011). But see FREYMAN, supra note 2, at 34 (“Several
states do not require permits at all, but only disclosure of water use over a certain threshold
. . . .”).
79. See National Primary and Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards, 40 C.F.R.
§§ 50.1–50.18 (2007).
80. See Criteria and Standards for the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 40 C.F.R. §§ 125.1–125.139 (2006).
81. Requirements for Control Technology Determinations for Major Sources in Accordance with Clean Air Act Sections, 40 C.F.R. §§ 63.40–63.44 (1994); 40 C.F.R. § 125.3 (2000).
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by its nature be simpler to implement than others that regulate more
complex environmental issues.
Even so, regulating recycled water comes with its own challenges.
State regulators who enforce disposal have limited enforcement capacity.82 In many states, an oil and gas conservation agency has the power to
regulate disposal, and some such agencies have less enforcement infrastructure than corresponding environmental agencies.83 Additionally,
producers will need new technology to recycle water in especially salty
formations.84 As a result, any regulatory system must be carefully designed to sufficiently support technology development and enforcement
capabilities.
The status quo of recycling depends on the location of fracking
operations. Geologic and economic factors determine the availability of
disposal options, and scarcity of such options determines the level of industry interest in recycling wastewater from hydraulic fracturing. In
Pennsylvania, industry increasingly recycles wastewater from hydraulic
fracturing because there are no underground formations in which to inject it and the only other option is to truck the polluted water for underground injection in Ohio.85 As a result, producers recycle 80 percent of
Pennsylvania’s wastewater from hydraulic fracturing.86 Producers are
much slower to invest in recycling where underground injection is readily available, as in Colorado and Texas.87 Geologic factors that impact
cost, such as water quality and availability of disposal methods, have a
greater impact on decisions to recycle wastewater from hydraulic fracturing than water scarcity.
Industry cannot recycle wastewater from hydraulic fracturing in
some regions where water is the scarcest until it develops technology to
sufficiently clean the water for reuse. One of the greatest factors in recycling wastewater from hydraulic fracturing is the initial quality of pro82. Will Reisinger et al., Environmental Enforcement and the Limits of Cooperative Federalism: Will Courts Allow Citizen Suits to Pick Up the Slack?, 20 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1,
16–23 (2010).
83. See Mike Soraghan, In N.M., 3,600 violations, 1 court case, 0 fines, ENERGYWIRE (Nov.
14, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059990413.
84. NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., STATE OIL AND NATURAL GAS REGULATIONS DESIGNED TO
PROTECT WATER RESOURCES 30 (2009).
85. Sheila M. Olmstead et al., Shale Gas Development Impacts on Surface Water Quality in
Pennsylvania, 110 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. 4962, 4966 (2013), available at http://www.pnas
.org/content/110/13/4962.full.pdfťml.
86. Merrill & Schizer, supra note 3, at 179 n.165.
87. FREYMAN, supra note 2, at 73 (“[In Colorado, a]s in Texas, water recycling rates
remain low, predominantly driven by the easy access to deep disposal wells in many parts
of the state. In regions where water recycling is higher, deep disposal wells are harder to
find.”).
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duced water, namely the salinity level.88 In Pennsylvania, produced
water from the Marcellus shale play consists of up to 200,000 milligrams
per liter of TDS.89 The low salinity level, combined with expensive disposal options and strict reporting regulations, likely impacts the high level
of recycled wastewater from hydraulic fracturing. Anecdotal evidence90
indicates that producers are conducting a similar cost benefit analysis in
the Permian and Barnett shale plays in Texas. Produced water in the Barnett shale play contains 50,000–140,000 parts per million of TDS,91 while
produced water in the Permian Basin averages 89,000 parts per million
TDS.92 In the Permian Basin, the Apache Corporation recycles 100 percent of its produced water93 in part because the water has less brine and
is easier to treat.94 With this newly developed technology, Apache also
cleans other naturally occurring brackish water to use in their operations.95 In the Barnett Shale, on the other hand, oil and gas producers use
less than five percent recycled water.96 Although current technology may
allow oil and gas producers to choose recycling operations where water
88. Katie L. Benko & Jörg E. Drewes, Coproduced Water Occurrence and Composition, 25
ENVTL. ENGINEERING SCI, 2, 245 (2008).
89. Gay et al., supra note 21, at 6.
90. Limited reporting makes it impossible to directly compare the level of recycling in
these shale plays. See JEAN-PHILIPPE NICOT, ROBERT C. REEDY, RUTH A. COSTLEY & YUN
HUANG, OIL & GAS WATER USE IN TEXAS: UPDATE TO THE 2011 MINING WATER USE REPORT 6
(2012), available at http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/publications/reports/contracted_reports/
doc/0904830939_2012Update_MiningWaterUse.pdf (“Access to detailed information about
water sources on the provider side is difficult. Large water suppliers do not necessarily
track the ultimate usage of their water. Groundwater conservation districts (GCD’s) do not
always collect information about withdrawal amounts and eventual use of the water. A
request to the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) on reuse of treatment
water yielded a helpful list of facilities but not the amount of water transferred, and further
this does not account for direct reuse at a site. The demand side, that is, operators, is very
fragmented.”).
91. Mantell, supra note 33, at 12. Although the salinity of both Texas basins is near or
less than the Marcellus Shale, incentive to recycle is less because Texas is “blessed” with
underground injection. Id. at 20.
92. Katie L. Benko & Jörg E. Drewes, Produced Water in the Western United States: Geographical Distribution, Occurrence, and Composition, 25 ENTVL. ENGINEERING SCI. 239, 243
(2008).
93. Anna Driver & Terry Wade, Fracking Without Freshwater at a West Texas Oilfield,
REUTERS (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/21/us-apache-wateridUSBRE9AK08Z20131121 (“Excluding outlays for its homegrown recycling system,
Apache says it costs 29 cents a barrel to treat flowback water. That is a fraction of the $2.50
per barrel it costs to dispose of water using a third party.”).
94. FREYMAN, supra note 2, at 58.
95. Id.
96. Jean-Philippe Nicot, Bridget R. Scanlon, Robert C. Reedy & Ruth A. Costley, Source
and Fate of Hydraulic Fracturing Water in the Barnett Shale: A Historical Perspective, 2014 ENVI.
SCI. TECH. 48, 2464, 2467.
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is easiest to clean, water scarcity is a local issue, which requires conservation on a local level.97 To successfully increase recycling on a state-wide
basis, regulatory systems must help develop and apply increased technology that cleans even the saltiest of water.
On a less technical front, states face varying degrees of political
barriers to implement additional regulatory control on oil and gas operations. In Colorado, political will has been a driving force for some of the
strictest oil and gas regulations in the nation.98 Yet, Colorado continues
to face political battles between the industry and workforce surrounding
oil and gas and a growing populous interested in banning hydraulic
fracturing altogether.99 New Mexico, in contrast, has experienced mixed
results in strictly regulating the oil and gas industry. In 2008, Democrat
Governor Bill Richardson’s administration promulgated the strictest pit
rule in the nation.100 Upon election in 2010, Republican Governor Susana
Martinez suspended the 2008 rule and initiated a review of the regulations.101 The amended rule maintained pit lining and reporting requirements but abandoned efforts to mandate closed loop systems.102 The
revised rule allows producers to use multi-well fluid management pits,103
which may also make it easier to recycle wastewater from hydraulic fracturing.104 With conflicts like these in mind, oil and gas production regula97. See FREYMAN, supra note 2, at 7.
98. STATE REVIEW OF OIL AND GAS ENVTL. REGULATIONS, COLORADO HYDRAULIC FRACTURING STATE REVIEW 4 (2011) (“The review team has concluded that the Colorado program
is well managed and professional and generally meets the 2010 Hydraulic Fracturing
Guidelines.”); see Richardson ET AL., supra note 52, at 13 (ranking Colorado in the top five
states for regulating all elements of hydraulic fracturing).
99. See Jack Healy, With Ban on Drilling Practice, Town Lands in Thick of Dispute, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 25, 2012 (“‘I had no idea we could upset an entire state government and a
trillion-dollar industry,’ said Michael Bellmont, an insurance agent who helped gather
thousands of signatures and knocked on doors to persuade voters [to ban hydraulic
fracturing].”).
100. Mike Soraghan, N.M. is Loosening Drilling Rules, Bucking Trends and Riling Ranchers,
E&E NEWS (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059972526.
101. Id.; see also Jim Magill, Gas industry cheers New Mexico ‘pit rule’ rewrite, 30 PLATTS
GAS DAILY 111, June 11, 2013, available at 2013 WLNR 15464990 (reporting that, “in [Republican Susana Martinez’s]successful 2010 bid to succeed Richardson, a Democrat, she campaigned on a platform to revise the [pit] rule.”).
102. See, e.g., N.M. CODE R. §§ 19.15.17.9(B), 19.15.17.13(F) (LexisNexis 2015); see also
Staci Matlock, Martinez and King sharply divided on environment, THE SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, Oct. 16, 2014, available at 2014 WLNR 28920643.
103. Regulators repeal, replace pit rule, Santa Fe New Mexican (June 6, 2013), http://www
.santafenewmexican.com/news/local_news/article_1a277249-326e-5b85-82ef53b4004d5a78.html.
104. New Mexico Pit Rule Changes Agreeable to Industry, SHALE DAILY (June 13, 2013),
http://www.naturalgasintel.com/articles/4917-new-mexico-pit-rule-changes-agreeableto-industry.
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tions must be evaluated in the context of each state’s current political
climate.
Regulations to increase recycling of wastewater from hydraulic
fracturing may be more politically palatable than other regulatory burdens. Indeed, in 2013 the New Mexico Oil Conservation Division highlighted a growing interest in recycling wastewater from hydraulic
fracturing and clarified relevant regulations for the process.105 Then in
2015, New Mexico successfully promulgated a rule to encourage recycling.106 A spokesperson for Earthworks, an environmental group that
promotes “sustainable solutions” for mineral and energy development,107
was skeptical of the regulation’s actual impact.108 The group, however,
reserved harsher criticism until the public could determine whether the
rule results in any actual freshwater savings.109 Other environmentalists
are actually investing in research to increase recycling.110 Still, others seek
solely to prohibit hydraulic fracturing practices rather than improve
them.111 Increased water reuse provides a true potential win-win for politicians across the spectrum. The real challenge will be to manage opposing interests. While producers may want to remove barriers, receive
incentives for technology development, and continue hydraulic fracturing, others may want to penalize wastewater disposal and potentially
eliminate hydraulic fracturing altogether through overregulation.

105. N.M. OIL CONSERVATION DIV., NOTICE OF RE-USE OF PRODUCED WATER, DRILLING
FLUIDS AND OTHER LIQUID OIL FIELD WASTE (Sept. 9 2013), available at http://www
.emnrd.state.nm.us/OCD/documents/Noticeproducedwaterre-use.pdf.
106. N.M. CODE R. §§ 19.15.34.1–19.15.34.21 (LexisNexis 2015).
107. About Earthworks, EARTHWORKS, http://www.earthworksaction.org/about (last
visited Apr. 13, 2015).
108. New rule clears way for NM oil producers to reuse water, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Mar. 19,
2015), http://www.abqjournal.com/557662/biz/biz-most-recent/new-rule-clears-way-fornm-oil-producers-to-reuse-water.html.
109. Id.
110. Patrick J. Kiger, Green Fracking? 5 Technologies for Cleaner Shale Energy, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC DAILY NEWS (Mar. 19, 2014), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/
2014/03/140319-5-technologies-for-greener-fracking/ (“‘Natural gas is a potential energy
bounty for the country, and development is probably inevitable,’ said Ben Ratner, a project
manager for the nonprofit Environmental Defense Fund. . . . ‘That’s why we’re investing
our energy into doing everything, from science to policy to working with companies, to
maximize the potential climate advantage that gas has over coal . . . .’”).
111. See Ellen M. Gilmer, De-escalating’ War of Words in Colo. Still an Elusive Goal for Top
Industry Group, E&E News (June 10, 2013), http://www.eenews.net.lawproxy.unm.edu/
energywire/stories/1059982551/search?keyword=environmentalists+fracking+compro
mise.
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V. REGULATORY TOOLS TO ESTABLISH WORKABLE
REGULATORY SYSTEM
States do not need to start from scratch to establish a workable
regulatory system to increase recycling of wastewater from hydraulic
fracturing. Since the environmental movement began in the 1970s, the
United States developed different types of regulatory tools to address
environmental concerns.112 Each type of system—liability, cap and trade,
command and control, and taxation—has its own strengths and weaknesses. Some systems are better suited than others to address different
environmental concerns.113 Recycling wastewater from hydraulic fracturing will benefit most from a system that is easy to enforce with existing
infrastructure, supports increasing development of technology, encourages recycling in every basin, and is politically viable.114 The following
assessment evaluates liability, command and control, marketable permits, and taxation to establish a regulatory system that addresses these
specific needs.
A. Liability
Liability regulations designate a specific action as wrongful and
allow third parties to sue those who commit that action for the harm it
causes.115 Damage payments then provide a source of funds to remedy
environmental harms. Governments impose liability retroactively, but liability creates a threat of litigation for future harm.116 Litigation, however, is both slow117 and an inefficient use of resources.118 In addition,
governments typically use it to punish damaging actions that are outside
acceptable behavior norms because it works by making such actions ille-

112. Robert B. McKinstry Jr., James McElfish, Michael Jacobson & Derald J. Hay, Legal
Tools that Provide Direct Protection for Elements of Biodiversity, 16 WIDENER WIDW L.J. 909, 911
(2007).
113. See Michael Faure, Effectiveness of Environmental Law: What Does the Evidence Tell
Us?, 36 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 293, 301–19 (2012).
114. See supra notes 75–110 and accompanying discussion.
115. Merrill & Schizer, supra note 3, at 209.
116. See Faure, supra note 113, at 301.
117. Robert E. Beck, Current Water Issues in Oil and Gas Development and Production: Will
Water Control What Energy We Have?, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 423, 440 (2010) (“However, with the
water resource, the primary focus should be on protecting the resource from damage and
not on the recovery of damages afterwards.”).
118. Jerome M. Organ, Superfund and the Settlement Decision: Reflections on the Relationship Between Equity and Efficiency, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1043, 1043 (1994) (“CERCLA’s
critics continue to complain about delays in accomplishing remediation and about excessive transaction costs attributable to litigation resulting from CERCLA’s liability system.”).
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gal.119 Liability encourages actors to take action to avoid punishment for
large scale environmental harm, but it is difficult and slow to implement
and does little to encourage the best behavior out of a range of legal
behavior.
Consequently, liability regulation is an unsuitable solution for increasing recycling. States lack the resources to initiate large-scale litigation.120 More importantly, legislation that makes water consumption
illegal is a drastic step. Inefficient water use, regrettably, is not an action
outside of acceptable norms.121 Many water users do not conserve or recycle water122 and the oil and gas industry should not be held to a higher
standard while other actors face no similar repercussions. A liability
scheme for all water waste would require a definition of excessive water
use, which would likely need to vary by industry and location.123 Even if
such action were politically viable, a suitable regulatory system would
require a hard line that could be difficult to reflect and encourage tech-

119. Merrill & Schizer, supra note 3, at 209 (noting that pure liability allows injured
persons to sue “if the perpetrator has breached the relevant duty of care” and further finding that liability may be suitable to regulate water pollution risks). While liability may
present an opportunity to safeguard against threats to water quality from hydraulic fracturing, it is less suitable to increase waste water recycling in hydraulic fracturing.
120. See Faure, supra note 113, at 302 (“There is equal evidence that the administrative
costs (a large part consisting of legal fees paid to the lawyers) of Superfund (especially
litigation) can be spectacularly high as well.”).
121. See Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for
Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919, 923 (1998) (asserting that the beneficial use
doctrine “allows, and even encourages, inefficient water use”).
122. See, e.g., Derek Adrian Hoye, Aligning Visions for the Bay-Delta: Market-Based Ecosystem Restoration Through Agricultural Efficiency Improvements, 3 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J.
209, 236 (2009) (advocating for a stricter definition of reasonable use to increase agricultural
conservation, concluding that “[e]nforcement must begin with increased accountability for
irrigators”); Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 339 n.2, (1984) (Stevens, dissenting)
(arguing that the majority erred by refusing to equitably apportion water despite “essentially undisputed” evidence that “at least 2,000 acre-feet of water were being wasted by just
one of the four principal users in New Mexico”).
123. See Robert A. Pulver, Liability Rules As A Solution to the Problem of Waste in Western
Water Law: An Economic Analysis, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 722 (1988) (“Since water demand
varies among water districts, an irrigation technique that is efficient in one river basin may
not be efficient in another.”). Pulver actually argues that liability could encourage water
conservation, for irrigation practices and water conveyance. Id. at 725. Even in this narrow
application, he relies on state agency capacity to administer such a system with “expert
knowledge of irrigation techniques and water needs within specific river basins,” advocating for agency publication of specific conveyance guidelines and enforcement with measures such as daily onsite inspection, aerial surveillance, and mechanical measuring
devices. Id. at 722–24.

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMN\55-2\NMN205.txt

426

unknown

Seq: 18

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

18-JUN-15

11:25

Vol. 55

nological advances.124 Most water users and water regulators would
likely agree that liability is neither a practical option nor a politically
feasible means to increase recycling of wastewater from hydraulic fracturing, since water is cheap and states do not require the most efficient
water use.
B. Command and Control
Command and control regulations prescribe rules to directly control harmful activities.125 A command and control regulation imposes absolute limits on regulated behavior, and in its purest form, mandates the
type of technology necessary to achieve that goal.126 For example, command and control regulations require ships to carry lifeboats and cars to
have seat belts.127 Command and control regulations also include permitting128 and reporting requirements.129 Perhaps the greatest benefit of command and control regulation is that it provides certainty to industry,
regulators, and environmentalists alike.130 With clear costs, businesses
may more easily plan.131
Critics raise a number of arguments, however, against command
and control regulations. Governments set command and control regula-

124. Such a system would face the same challenges as command and control regulations to define changing standards and technology. See infra notes 127–32 and accompanying text.
125. Timothy F. Malloy, The Social Construction of Regulation: Lessons from the War
Against Command and Control, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 267, 268 (2010).
126. See David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?: Replacing the Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289, 297
(1998) (noting that although it is generally accepted that command and control regulations
mandate technology, such command and control regulations are the exception not the
rule).
127. Merrill & Schizer, supra note 3, at 206.
128. See Walter G. Wright, Jr. & Albert J. Thomas III, The Federal/Arkansas Water Pollution Control Programs: Past, Present, and Future, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 541, 550–51
(2001) (discussion the Clean Water Act’s permitting system).
129. Faure, supra note 100, at 319 (“[R]elative cost efficiency of various instruments
(emission taxes, emission standards and technology standards) also needs to be compared
with the information, monitoring, and costs of enforcement instruments (criminal fines,
administrative fines, civil sanctions) to find an optimal combination of various
instruments.”).
130. See Adam Babich, A New Era in Environmental Law, COLO. LAW., Mar. 1991, at 435,
438 (noting that command and control regulations “comprise a system familiar to the regulated community, environmentalists, lawyers and politicians”).
131. Merrill & Schizer, supra note 3, at 207 (“Especially in making significant long term
investments, firms may prefer certain—even if potentially excessive—costs to highly uncertain costs.”).
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tions and typically apply them equally to all businesses.132 Whereas independent business decisions reflect costs and benefits for each business,
government regulations are more often based on technological ability.133
Consequently, command and control regulations can cause inefficient investments where some entities must invest in expensive solutions to
achieve the same environmental goals that a more efficient entity could
accomplish with fewer resources.134 Moreover, although command and
control regulations are not necessarily limited to technology-based “design standards,”135 reliance on existing technological ability to set the
standards can slow adaption to innovation.136 At the same time, a static
control does not allow for more efficient alternatives to compliance,
which can stifle economic development in regions where compliance is
not cost effective.137 Command and control may not, therefore, be the
most politically viable solution.138 Although command and control establishes a hard line that holds everyone accountable, it lacks the dynamism
and flexibility necessary for technological advancement.
Further, rigid command and control standards would harm small
oil and gas producers and fail to continuously incentivize recycling wastewater from hydraulic fracturing. Whereas large-scale operators may
have the economies of scale to invest in technology and recycle water
throughout their operations, it may be less economically feasible for
small independent producers to invest in the same expensive technology

132. Id. at 206.
133. Id. at 207.
134. Driesen, supra note 126, at 307–309 (further arguing that should be balanced
against expense of public resources to enforce a non-uniform system).
135. Malloy, supra note 125, at 283–84 (“Generally speaking, regulatory standards can
be structured either as ‘design standards’ or ‘performance standards.’ A design standard
requires the facility to use a specific type of equipment or work practice to control emission. A performance standard instead sets an emission rate or other measure of performance to be attained, leaving it to the regulated entity to select the particular technology or
work practice.”); see Driesen, supra note 126, at 297 n.57 (noting that even the Clean Water
Act’s Best Available Technology standards, a frequently cited example of technology based
command and control, also requires performance standards that may be satisfied through a
choice of techniques).
136. Malloy, supra note 125, at 284 (acknowledging a nuanced criticism that “theoretical
flexibility is lost in practice because firms are pressured to adopt the underlying reference
technology on which the performance standard had been based.”).
137. Driesen, supra note 126, at 307 (“Because facilities have unequal compliance costs,
uniform standards demand relatively expensive reductions from some facilities without
securing greater reductions from facilities with lower compliance costs.”). Consequently,
development may simply not be viable in certain regions.
138. Id. at 309 (“Lobbyists for regulated industries may use the term ‘command and
control’ without regard to accuracy, because it helps undermine the political legitimacy of
traditional regulation.”).
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to clean a much smaller amount of water. Meanwhile, a static limit without flexibility to trade between producers provides little incentive to continuously invest in better technology to clean water. A strict static limit
could also restrict development in places where water is too salty to
clean with current technology. Command and control standards lack
flexibility, which could harm both the diverse industry makeup and
technological development.139
Still, government entities should consider altering existing command and control regulations to help enforce a regulatory incentive system by removing current barriers to recycling and increasing reporting
requirements. As discussed previously, some states no longer require
permits to recycle on-site or transfer water to another operator for recycling in drilling operations.140 A more recent New Mexico rule provides relaxed storage standards for recycling options.141 States should
continue this trend. States should also implement reporting requirements, which may help enforce the regulatory system and build public
support along the way.142 Pennsylvania, for example, requires producers
to report the amount of wastewater they recycle.143 Producers have even
more of an incentive to invest in recycling if an informed public is watching. Reporting requirements also help investors evaluate the long term
risks of a project.144 Since reporting can be burdensome for industry and
unhelpfully dense, such requirements should be narrowly tailored and
consolidated in a format that is easy to understand.145

139. See David Blackmon, Why Oil & Gas Should Be Regulated By The States, FORBES (Oct.
15, 2013, 1:04 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidblackmon/2013/10/15/why-oilgas-should-be-regulated-by-the-states/ (“This is the difference between being regulated at
the state level by state agencies who understand their various resources bases and stakeholder groups and can get permits issued in a matter of days, and being regulated in a
command-and-control, one-size-fits-all manner that federal regulations inevitably
become.”).
140. See supra note 52, at 44 and accompanying text.
141. Compare N.M. CODE R. §§ 19.15.34.1–19.15.34.21 (LexisNexis 2015) with N.M. CODE
R. §§ 19.15.17.1–19.15.34.16 (LexisNexis 2015).
142. Merrill & Schizer, supra note 3, at 149 (“In addition, the public must believe that
shale drilling is safe. Otherwise, the shale revolution could be vulnerable to regulatory
overkill, as media stories about flaming water faucets, brown well water, and sickly farm
animals prompt widespread public apprehension about water contamination.”).
143. 25 PA. CODE § 78.122(b)(6)(vi) (2011).
144. See FREYMAN, supra note 2, at 46 (“Investors similarly lament that they don’t have
full information to assess water risks.”).
145. See Merrill & Schizer, supra note 3, at 208 (“One must remember, however, that
gathering and disseminating information can be costly, and that information overload can
be counterproductive.”).
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C. Marketable Permit Systems
Marketable permit systems, also known as “cap and trade,” create
property rights based on a particular activity and allow businesses to
trade those rights within government regulated markets.146 Governments
establish scarcity by capping the activity,147 but retain flexibility by allowing businesses to trade credits.148 The market to trade credits can vary
by limiting trade to within a localized region or allowing bigger markets
that span political jurisdictions.149 Marketable permits seek to “harness
private-sector financial calculations in the market on a day-to-day basis”
to limit environmental harm.150
Cap and trade offers several benefits that distinguish it from its
“crankier sibling, the ‘command-and-control’ regulation.”151 Prior to the
defeat of the Waxman-Markey greenhouse gas cap and trade legislation
in 2009,152 marketable permits were more politically palatable than taxbased regulation153 in large part because the federal government effectively regulated pollutants that cause acid rain in the 1990s.154 Critics specifically highlight several factors that contributed to the success of the
Acid Rain Program: rigorous enforcement made possible by strict report-

146. Babich, supra note 130, at 438.
147. Daniel A. Farber, Pollution Markets and Social Equity: Analyzing the Fairness of Cap
and Trade, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 5 (2012) (“The permits have scarcity value because emissions
are subject to an overall cap. . . .”).
148. Id. at 4 (“[Cap and trade] sets a rigid cap on emissions of a target pollutant for a
constellation of regulated entities but also leaves them significant discretion to decide how
to comply.”).
149. Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice and Domestic Climate Change Policy, 38 ENVTL.
L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10287, 10292 (2008).
150. Janet E. Milne, Environmental Taxation in the United States: The Long View, 15 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 417, 421 (2011).
151. Bruce R. Huber, How Did RGGI Do It? Political Economy and Emissions Auctions, 40
ECOLOGY L.Q. 59, 60 (2013).
152. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009); see
also Chris Good, Almost Every 2012 Republican Candidate Has a Cap-and-Trade Problem, THE
ATLANTIC (May 13, 2011, 7:30 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/
05/almost-every-2012-republican-has-a-cap-and-trade-problem/238776/. According to the
Environmental Protection Agency, the legislation would have established “an economy
wide cap & trade program” and created “other incentives and standards for increasing
energy efficiency and low carbon energy consumption.” Office of Atmospheric Programs,
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Analysis of the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 H.R. 2454 in the 111th Congress 3 (June 23, 2009), available at http://www.epa
.gov/climatechange/Downloads/EPAactivities/HR2454_Analysis.pdf.
153. See Milne, supra note 150, at 428 n.34 (noting that the historical preference for marketable permits is in part attributable to “the bruising experience with President Clinton’s
proposed Btu tax in 1993”). It is unclear whether this historical preference remains the case.
154. Driesen, supra note 126, at 318.
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ing requirements, careful monitoring, and relatively simple regulated
sources.155 Cap and trade can effectively encourage pollution reductions
if the system provides anticipated, staged reductions and adequate monitoring.156 Cap and trade also helps sustain diverse markets with businesses of varied resources. Whereas command and control regulations
require all businesses to invest in mandated technology, cap and trade
allow businesses to choose whether to invest in upgrading technology or
purchase credits to come into compliance.157
Yet cap and trade permits also present challenges. To create a
workable system, the government must not only determine a limit but
also establish a market.158 The time lapse between enactment and credit
creation can actually slow transition because industry may worsen behavior before the cap is set or delay improvements until after the cap is
set in order to receive credit for those improvements after the market
opens.159 Moreover, allowing industry to trade credits for taxed behavior
can exacerbate local impacts in places where individual facilities may
purchase permits to continue their behavior.160Businesses purchase credits where compliance is more difficult, and when that is concentrated in a
localized area, it creates a “hot spot” that remains out of compliance.161
Often, these hot spots exist in communities with less political capital to
influence business decisions.162 It is arguably more difficult to enforce
cap and trade regulations than technology-based command and control
regulations because agencies must continually monitor the regulated ac-

155. Scott Schang & Teresa Chan, Federal Greenhouse Gas Control Options from an Enforcement Perspective, 2 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 87, 93 (2010).
156. See Driesen, supra note 126, at 318, 325 (describing successful attributes of the
Clean Air Act amendment to stop acid rain).
157. See Byron Swift, How Environmental Laws Work: An Analysis of the Utility Sector’s
Response to Regulation of Nitrogen Oxides and Sulfur Dioxide Under the Clean Air Act, 14 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 309, 343 (2001) (“Allowance trading encouraged utilities to seek out ‘least-cost’
compliance options among their plants in order to minimize the cost of compliance. Such
strategies can be clearly seen in firms’ decisions to install scrubbers on the largest plants,
where the cost per ton of emission reductions would be the lowest. . . .”).
158. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale for
Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L.J. 729, 745 (1991) (describing the challenges to
setting up an effective market).
159. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, VEHICLE EMISSIONS: EPA PROGRAM TO ASSIST
LEADED-GASOLINE PRODUCERS 20 (1986) (“The introduction of inter-refinery trading into the
lead phasedown program probably slowed the pace of environmental improvement. EPA’s
1985 trading rule actually led to increased production of leaded gasoline in 1985.”).
160. Adam Babich, A New Era in Environmental Law, 20 COLO. LAW. 435, 438 (Feb. 1991).
161. Stephen M. Johnson, Economics v. Equity: Do Market-Based Environmental Reforms
Exacerbate Environmental Injustice?, 56 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 111, 129 (1999).
162. Id. at 131.
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tion.163 Industry also has an incentive “to exaggerate the value of reduction credits[,]” which must be carefully monitored.164 Cap and trade is
not necessarily the best solution for complex systems that are difficult to
regulate and require immediate change.
Finally, marketable permits with a static limit do not necessarily
produce continuous or uniform innovation. Cap and trade likely offers
more of an incentive for innovation beyond the regulated limit because
businesses have the incentive to reduce the regulated activity to sell additional credits.165 Even so, all businesses in the market will reach equilibrium where businesses are below the static limit by either purchasing
credits to pay for the regulated activity or reducing their activity and
selling credits. At that point, businesses have no incentive to develop
new technology to further reduce the regulated activity.166 Marketable
permits may also reduce innovation by allowing industry to reform behavior in facilities where it is easiest rather than investing in new technologies to reduce the behavior across the board.167 This elective
efficiency may not only reduce innovation but also exacerbate local impacts where it is harder to reduce the regulated activity.
Market based permits offer some opportunities for regulating recycling of wastewater from hydraulic fracturing but pose challenges to
avoid localized water scarcity and continue technological development
beyond the imposed cap. Since state regulators already measure wastewater from hydraulic fracturing and permit its disposal, cap and trade
provides opportunities to increase recycling while allowing flexibility.
By allowing permit trading instead of imposing a general cap, businesses
with less initial investment capacity may have a better opportunity to
remain competitive. If states act now, the time lag to set up the system

163. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale for
Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L.J. 729, 748–49 (1991) (arguing that technology
based “strategies are less expensive to enforce because inspectors are only required to determine whether a firm has installed the required technology and continues to operate it
properly”).
164. Driesen, supra note 126, at 310.
165. Natalie M. Derzko, Using Intellectual Property Law and Regulatory Processes to Foster
the Innovation and Diffusion of Environmental Technologies, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 3, 51
(1996); see also Parisa Smith, Can the Success of Carbon Emission Cap-and-Trade Market Be
Predicted Based on the EPA’s Acid Rain Program?, 6 APPALACHIAN NAT. RESOURCES L.J. 57, 78
(2012) (noting that business investment in scrubbers actually delayed investment in longer
term, more sustainable solutions and prolonged the life of high-emitting facilities).
166. Driesen, supra note 126, at 325 (“Once the polluters regulated by a trading program
have reached an equilibrium providing the reductions that the governmental body required, no incentive for further reductions exists.”).
167. Id. at 334 (“The low-cost facilities probably have a greater ability to provide reductions without substantial innovation than high-cost facilities.”).
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may not hinder the overall success of the program so long as the system
achieves necessary results upon establishment. While a marketable permit system may successfully achieve more efficiency, it will cause industry to postpone investment in technology where it is more costly to clean
saltier water. If the market is defined too broadly, industry will only
clean wastewater from hydraulic fracturing in regions where the water is
relatively inexpensive to clean. In markets that contain different qualities
of underground water, industry will purchase credits for the areas with
saltier water. Since some of the hardest to clean water occurs in regions
with the greatest water scarcity, such a system would do little to address
local price increases and pressure on existing uses.
To avoid this problem, governments could limit localized impacts
by limiting markets to within a basin. Typically, water quality does not
drastically vary across a basin.168 Similarly, disposal costs only differ
marginally across a basin.169 A basin-wide market should provide a wide
enough range of operations to allow enough options for producers to
buy and sell credits.170
Water market forces will also push producers towards recycling
in water scarce regions as long as the entire basin is regulated. Although
water is relatively cheap, it will be relatively more expensive in places
where it is in higher demand. Where fresh water costs more, producers
will have more of an incentive to recycle. Challenges will remain where
basins span state lines and only one state regulates wastewater recycling.
Governments should pursue inter-jurisdictional regulations to the extent
that it is possible. Water managers have long dreamt of managing watersheds across jurisdictions.171 Although inter-jurisdictional watershed
management may still be too complex to realize,172 perhaps the same political will can drive an inter-jurisdictional water conservation program.
Even so, cap and trade may not be the most effective at continuing
to drive innovation once businesses have found an equilibrium—where
all remaining businesses have purchased or sold enough credits to eco168. Katie L. Benko & Jörg E. Drewes, Coproduced Water Occurrence and Composition, 25
ENVTL. ENGINEERING SCI, 2, 245 (2008).
169. See Alison Sider et al., Drillers Begin Reusing ‘Frack Water’, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 20,
2012), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405297020393700457807718311240
9260 (noting that frac-wastewater disposal cost “varies from state to state”).
170. Derzko, supra note 165, at 53 (“A marketable permit regime may also be ineffective
where there is either a very small or a very large number of polluters.”).
171. William deBuys, Visions of Western Governance: Powell and His Successors, 23 J. LAND
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 15, 15–16 (2003).
172. G. Tracy Mehan, III, A Symphonic Approach to Water Management: The Quest for New
Models of Watershed Governance, 26 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 14 (2010) (“So it is necessary
to work over, under, around, and through the political boundaries that appear to constrain
watershed perspective.”).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMN\55-2\NMN205.txt

unknown

Seq: 25

18-JUN-15

11:25

Spring 2015WATER USE AND RECYCLING IN HYDRAULIC FRACTURING433

nomically comply. Once businesses have developed sufficient technology to make the entire market compliant, the cost of a credit will not be
enough to further spur investment to develop better technology to recycle even more water. Even cap and trade’s most successful application,
ending acid rain in the 1990s, did not spur new innovation; instead, it
disseminated standard methods of emission-control.173 Although a
nuanced cap and trade system can solve valuable issues such as flexibility for a diverse market and even localized change, it still does little to
truly incentivize new technological innovation.
Cap and trade comes closer to addressing regulatory needs to increase wastewater recycling than liability or command and control. Cap
and trade allows flexibility for producers to determine the best ways to
contribute to an overall increase in recycling. Localized markets would
ensure that recycling improves in saltier basins as well. Lastly, capped
disposal would spur some technological innovation. Yet, innovation
would stop once businesses reach equilibrium below the cap. As such,
cap and trade alone would likely not develop the technology necessary
to recycle the dirtiest water.
D. Taxation
Taxation resembles command and control regulation and regulation through liability, but it retains valuable differences.174 Similar to liability rules, taxes “set a price on an externality which is imposed only
after it is generated.”175 Like command and control regulations, taxes impose a cost for risky or harm-causing actions and limit consequent
harm.176 Unlike command and control regulations, however, industry retains the choice to pay to continue to engage in behavior because it is not
banned outright.177 Since governments can tax an activity at any level,
governments can choose whether to set a limit and tax only after a certain point, increase the tax as the activity increases, or tax a specific
amount of the activity. If the cost of the tax is higher than the cost of
developing technology to control the activity, industry will develop new
technology.178 As the technology develops, industry increasingly saves
more money compared to paying the tax.179 Meanwhile, policy makers

173. Driesen, supra note 126, at 318.
174. Merrill & Schizer, supra note 3, at 209 n.317.
175. Id.
176. Kyle D. Logue, Coordinating Sanctions in Tort, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2313, 2325 (2010).
177. Milne, supra note 150, at 421.
178. See Malloy, supra note 125, at 344 (describing the conventional view that taxes can
encourage businesses to actively seek cost-effective innovations).
179. Driesen, supra note 126, at 342.
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can dedicate taxes paid to further address the problem.180 Taxation drives
quick change by regulating actions on a relatively immediate basis, empowers industry decision-making, continuously drives innovation, and
produces revenue for the government.
Taxation also has its challenges. Whereas cap and trade markets
determine credit prices, a governmental body establishes and quantifies
taxes. Taxes to force technology innovation require precision to continuously shift behavior.181 Governments must also ensure that technological
innovation is possible and not too heavy a burden for businesses to profitably sustain.182 Unlike cap and trade, the government, not entrepreneurial businesses, profits from charging regulated activities.
Taxes also become political lightning rods, which cause uncertainty as
politicians threaten to remove and replace taxation schemes from one
legislative session to the next.183 Although taxes can incentivize continuous improvements in environmental performance, governments must
carefully craft them to decrease the targeted activity without significantly injuring the industry to avoid political backlash.
States could incentivize recycling by taxing businesses that inject
the wastewater underground. With a carefully designed system, producers would have an immediate incentive to recycle less salty water even
where disposal methods are available. To address the existing technology gaps, the legislature could use incoming taxes to “pay” for research
and development programs to implement technology and support efforts to develop economically viable techniques to clean even saltier
water.184 Governments could tax water injection at a higher rate in regions dealing with intense water scarcity to encourage technological development and recycling. A tax on underground injection would rely on
the existing tax enforcement structure,185 underground injection regula-

180. Milne, supra note 150, at 443.
181. See id. at 447 (noting the precision needed for taxes intended to shift to known
technology options).
182. Id. at 446–47 (“The end result often is not an idealized Pigouvian tax, but instead
what one might consider a pragmatic Pigouvian approach—a second-best tempered by
equity, economic impact, administrative feasibility, and political considerations.”).
183. See Driesen, supra note 126, at 342.
184. Government supported research and development was vital to the hydraulic fracturing boom, and arguably more influential than tax breaks for industry development.
ZHONGMIN WANG & ALAN KRUPNICK, RFF DP 13–12, A RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW OF SHALE
GAS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: WHAT LED TO THE BOOM? 3–4 (2013).
185. See Milne, supra note 150, at 425 (noting that “environmental tax instruments reflect the characteristics of the tax regimes to which they are harnessed . . . .”).
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tion,186 and reporting requirements for ratio of water use to provide
ongoing revenue for research and development and continuous incentive for technological dissemination.
VI. PILOT PROGRAM FOR COMPREHENSIVE REGULATORY
PROGRAM TO INCENTIVIZE WASTEWATER RECYCLING FROM
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING
To best achieve both continuous technical improvement and provide cost effective alternatives to small businesses, governments should:
implement a hybrid system of marketable permits and underground injection taxes; employ taxes to provide research and development for new
technological development; and loosen regulations to make recycling
easier and support joint recycling initiatives. This hybrid system of marketable permits and taxes would increase recycling in all basins and continue to develop technology to clean dirtier water. The ability to trade
permits would add flexibility for considerably smaller producers. The
government could improve enforcement by maintaining regulations for
other disposal methods and increasing reporting requirements for water
use and water recycling percentages. If successful, such a hybrid pilot
program could provide a foundation to encourage recycling and conservation for other water users.
A cap and trade system should cap producers at a percentage of
freshwater use and then allow businesses to trade credits for any additional amount of water recycled. By capping a percentage, smaller producers would not face a proportionately larger requirement than bigger
producers (as they would be if freshwater were capped at a raw quantity). By trading a raw quantity, small producers could not game the system by selling proportionate reductions to larger companies, reducing
the overall amount of water recycled. The percentage would have to be
determined based on the specific details of particular basins. Basins vary
in water quality,187 which may realistically impact the percentage of
water that can be recycled. In some developing shale plays, recycled
wastewater would be insufficient to supply the existing water needs for
hydraulically fracturing a new well.188 Consequently, the percentage cap
would have to take into account available supply compared to current

186. Due to the Safe Water Drinking Act, all states already regulate underground injection to some degree. NATHAN RICHARDSON, MADELINE GOTTLIEB, ALAN KRUPNICK &
HANNAH WISEMAN, THE STATE OF STATE SHALE GAS REGULATION 52 (2013).
187. Katie L. Benko & Jörg E. Drewes, Produced Water in the Western United States:
Goegraphical Distribution, Occurrence, and Composition, 25 ENVTL. ENGINEERING SCI, 2, 239
(2008).
188. FREYMAN, supra note 2, at 39.
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need. A carefully set percentage cap would be fair to all producers and
allow each producer to evaluate how to most efficiently comply while
providing a significant decrease in total freshwater used.
The system should also include a small tax on all underground
injection to continuously encourage technology development and to pay
for government support for research and development. The business incentive to avoid taxation at all levels bolsters the cap and trade incentive,
selling credits, to continue technology development. Revenue could also
sustain government research and development for new technology. By
combining these traits, the regulatory program would create a triple incentive for businesses to implement new technology.
Finally, government must support the purpose of cap and trade
regulations and the taxation requirements with command and control
regulations that facilitate, rather than hinder, wastewater recycling. Governments should remove regulations, such as water storage requirements and restrictions on wastewater pooling between hydraulic
fracturing producers, to allow businesses to recycle more easily. On the
other hand, governments must require water use and recycling information to both aid enforcement and garner public support. Finally, governments must closely monitor water disposal trends and regulate other
injection alternatives to avoid disposal in new, less environmentally
sound ways. This four tiered approach—marketable permits, taxation,
research and development, and command and control regulation—
achieves greater water use efficiency by both regulating and supporting
the oil and gas industry, which supports entire regions currently struggling with water scarcity.
Still, such a system faces challenges. Governments must consider
existing water use and water demand, regional price and quality variations, price barriers to technology development, and costs of implementation to design an effective tax and a marketable permit system. Any
initiative to increase an industry’s cost of production will be controversial. Before the legislature proposed to regulate greenhouse gases
through cap and trade, marketable permits were more politically palatable than taxation.189 On the other side, environmental groups are unlikely to readily support tax breaks for oil and gas producers,190
189. Milne, supra note 150, at 444 (2011) (“It remains to be seen whether the political gap
between a trading regime and a carbon tax has narrowed sufficiently to swing the pendulum toward a carbon tax . . . .”).
190. Carrie Cecil, Budget Battles: Would the Obama Administration’s Proposal to Eliminate
Oil and Gas Tax Subsidies Injure the Industry?, 8 PITT. TAX REV. 209, 211 (2011) (“Proponents
of the repeal of these provisions believe that increasing taxation on oil and gas would reduce the amount of capital employed in the oil and gas industry while encouraging substitution of other energy sources including coal, nuclear and renewable sources.”). In 2015,
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especially in the context of hydraulic fracturing. Even so, the combined
approach and a shared desire to increase recycling may be enough to
create political will to pass a comprehensive system.191
Water efficiency looks different in different industries, but general
lessons from a pilot program that incentivizes water conservation in hydraulic fracturing could translate to other water uses. Some municipalities are slowly starting to use desalination plants to add water to the
system.192 As technology develops, municipalities could transfer such operations for expanded use. Other cities are exploring water recycling
through “toilet to tap” technology.193 If the oil and gas system achieves
success by increasing water efficiency and eventually decreasing costs, a
cap and trade system on percentage of freshwater use could incentivize
municipal systematic change as well.

two Texas state representatives introduced bills to provide tax breaks for oil and gas producers that recycle wastewater from hydraulic fracturing. See Tex. H.B. 4035, 84th Leg. R.S.
(2015); Tex. H.B. 4021, 84th Leg. R.S. (2015); Jess Davis, Texas Pols Want Tax Credits For
Alternate Fracking Fluids, LAW360 (Mar. 16, 2015, 9:36 PM ET), http://www.law360.com/
articles/631579/texaspolswanttaxcreditsforalternatefrackingfluids. Republican State Representative Drew Darby, who sponsored H.B. 4035, described the bill not as a tax cut but as
“a shift in where taxes are paid.” Angela Neville, Bills: Promoting Green Fracking Through
Tax Credits, TEXAS LAWYER (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.texaslawyer.com/id=1202721799
825/Bills-Promoting-Green-Fracking-Through-Tax-Credits?slreturn=20150328002353. Representative Darby further asserted that the credits for water recycling or investment in local
community colleges shifted the tax payment to local communities rather than the state. Id.
(“In this case, [the tax goes] directly to local communities in the form of water or community colleges. . . .”). Despite Representative Darby’s efforts to promote his bill as an incentive for private investment, id., neither bill has received a vote in the Ways and Means
Committee. See History: Bill H.B. 4035, TEXAS LEGISLATURE ONLINE, www.legis.state.tx.us/
BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=84R&Bill=HB4035 (last visited Apr. 14, 2015); History:
Bill H.B. 4021, TEXAS LEGISLATURE ONLINE, www.legis.state.tx.us/BillLookup/History.aspx?
LegSess=84R&Bill=HB40321 (last visited Apr. 14, 2015).
191. Indeed, rare but exciting collaborations between industry and activists are already
occurring. See FREYMAN, supra note 2, at 5, 70 (touting efforts by the Center for Sustainable
Shale Development, a collaborative industry and NGOs that has established performance
standards that require operators to recycle at least 90 percent of wastewater from hydraulic
fracturing by 2014).
192. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DESALINATION: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 19–24 (2008).
Indeed, “[d]esalination plants have been built in every state in the United States, although
nearly half of the plants are small facilities built for specific industrial needs.” Id. at 17.
193. Deborah Sullivan Brennan, Tide turns for water purification plan, UT SAN DIEGO
(Apr. 27 2013), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2013/Apr/27/tap-toilet-water-purification-potable-reuse/.
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The greatest water user in the West is agriculture;194 however, it is
also one of the most politically insulated users.195 As water becomes
more valuable, farmers may benefit from desalination technology to utilize brackish water in aquifers that currently is unusable. Downstream
farmers also increasingly battle water quality issues as chemicals and
salts build up in water that farmers reuse throughout the system.196 With
the right investments, farmers and governments could adapt technology
from oil and gas to create cleaner water for farming.197 Cleaner water also
produces more, better quality crops.198 The hybrid program would bring
significant benefit to farmers, which could garner support from the agricultural community and make the program politically feasible.
Finally, once proven in other industries, farmers and other users
might be more amenable to cap and trade systems to encourage efficiency. Currently, states limit water use to “beneficial use”199 but do not
discriminate beyond that basic threshold.200 In addition, the system must
increasingly grapple with other values, such as environmental flows201
and maintaining traditional agriculture communities,202 which the mar-

194. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SERVICES, SUMMARY OF ESTIMATED WATER USE IN THE UNITED
STATES IN 2005 (2009), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2009/3098/pdf/2009-3098.pdf.
195. Alan O. Sykes, The Questionable Case for Subsidies Regulation: A Comparative Perspective, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 473, 475–76 (2010) (“Because the concentrated interests of producers command greater political support than the diffuse interests of consumers, national
governments find it much easier to emulate the vices of protection than the virtues of free
trade.”) (internal quotations omitted).
196. San Joaquin River Exch. Contractors Water Auth. v. State Water Res. Control Bd.,
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to the regional economy”).
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beneficial use doctrine.”).
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ket does not appropriately consider. A cap and trade or taxation system
might encourage increased efficiency in agriculture, establish funds to
support traditional agriculture communities, and make more water
available for environmental flows.
VII. CONCLUSION
If states want to increase recycling of wastewater from hydraulic
fracturing, governments must make alternative options scarce and remove regulations that inhibit recycling. Any accompanying regulatory
system must be predictable and implemented in a way that is relatively
easy to enforce, incentivizes continuous technology development, and
achieves recycling in water scarce regions even where it may be harder
to achieve.
Consequently, state governments should: (1) create a marketable
permit system that caps a percentage of freshwater use in hydraulic fracturing and establishes a basin wide market to trade credits; (2) tax options for disposal of un-recycled wastewater from hydraulic fracturing
based on water scarcity within a basin; (3) use the tax revenue to sustain
government research in new recycling technology; and (4) refine command and control regulations to further encourage recycling where enforcement is already ongoing and increase reporting requirements to
document regulatory success.
As the discussion further defines such a regulatory system, legislatures should continue to evaluate additional considerations, such as
timing of water use,203 energy conservation,204 and intellectual property’s
role in technology development.205 In addition, states should continue to
work collaboratively to conjunctively manage inter-jurisdictional shale
basins, particularly where states also share underground aquifers.
To be fair, increased regulation of water consumption in hydraulic
fracturing is largely undeserved. To impose new water efficiency requirements on an industry responsible for less than one percent of the
nation’s total water consumption may be counter intuitive and discrimi203. Depending on water demand and technology limits, states may consider incentivizing use of fresh water during the winter months, when there is less demand for agriculture, by providing offsets for such agreements.
204. See FREYMAN, supra note 2, at 39 (“Recycling water doesn’t always make sense. In
some cases water returning to the surface may be insufficient volume or too contaminated
(whether with salt, heavy metals or naturally occurring radioactive materials) to clean
without using large amounts of energy.”).
205. Cf. Peter Behr, Fracking Founder’s Foundation Searches for Shale Gas Answers,
ENERGYWIRE (Oct. 28, 2013) (noting that the person who developed hydraulic fracturing
chose to “leave his intellectual property to others in the industry in order to boost U.S. gas
and oil.”).
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natory. It may also seem unwise to use political capital to establish these
largely undue regulations when the industry’s impact on other environmental harms, such as methane emissions,206 may be far more deserved.
Yet in some regions, the oil and gas industry is already a leader in
water conservation. The industry stands to gain political support and
pacify objectors by piloting a program to take water conservation further. Water use remains a vital issue for farmers and environmentalists
alike. In such a situation, undue regulation may be necessary to explore
solutions to a problem that impacts everyone. Increased recycling of
wastewater from hydraulic fracturing benefits all water users, environmentalists, and even the oil and gas industry. These interests, which are
often at odds, may build trust by collaborating on such a system.

206. See Jennifer Oldham, Colorado First State to Clamp Down on Fracking Methane Pollution, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 23, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-24/coloradofirst-state-to-clamp-down-on-fracking-methane-pollution.html.

